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Abstract
Adversarial examples are typically constructed by perturbing an existing data point
within a small matrix norm, and current defense methods are focused on guarding
against this type of attack. In this paper, we propose unrestricted adversarial
examples, a new threat model where the attackers are not restricted to small norm-
bounded perturbations. Different from perturbation-based attacks, we propose to
synthesize unrestricted adversarial examples entirely from scratch using conditional
generative models. Specifically, we first train an Auxiliary Classifier Generative
Adversarial Network (AC-GAN) to model the class-conditional distribution over
data samples. Then, conditioned on a desired class, we search over the AC-GAN
latent space to find images that are likely under the generative model and are
misclassified by a target classifier. We demonstrate through human evaluation that
unrestricted adversarial examples generated this way are legitimate and belong to
the desired class. Our empirical results on the MNIST, SVHN, and CelebA datasets
show that unrestricted adversarial examples can bypass strong adversarial training
and certified defense methods designed for traditional adversarial attacks.
1 Introduction
Machine learning algorithms are known to be susceptible to adversarial examples: imperceptible
perturbations to samples from the dataset can mislead cutting edge classifiers [1, 2]. This has raised
concerns for safety-critical AI applications because, for example, attackers could use them to mislead
autonomous driving vehicles [3, 4, 5] or hijack voice controlled intelligent agents [6, 7, 8].
To mitigate the threat of adversarial examples, a large number of methods have been developed.
These include augmenting training data with adversarial examples [2, 9, 10, 11], removing adversarial
perturbations [12, 13, 14], and encouraging smoothness for the classifier [15]. Recently, [16, 17]
proposed theoretically-certified defenses based on minimizing upper bounds of the training loss under
worst-case perturbations. Although inspired by different perspectives, a shared design principle of
current defense methods is to make classifiers more robust to small perturbations of their inputs.
In this paper, we introduce a more general attack mechanism where adversarial examples are
constructed entirely from scratch instead of perturbing an existing data point by a small amount. In
practice, an attacker might want to change an input significantly while not changing the semantics.
Taking traffic signs as an example, an adversary performing perturbation-based attacks can draw
graffiti [4] or place stickers [18] on an existing stop sign in order to exploit a classifier. However,
the attacker might want to go beyond this and replace the original stop sign with a new one that
was specifically manufactured to be adversarial. In the latter case, the new stop sign does not have
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to be a close replica of the original one—the font could be different, the size could be smaller—as
long as it is still identified as a stop sign by humans. We argue that all inputs that fool the classifier
without confusing humans can pose potential security threats. In particular, we show that previous
defense methods, including the certified ones [16, 17], are not effective against this more general
attack. Ultimately, we hope that identifying and building defenses against such new vulnerabilities
can shed light on the weaknesses of existing classifiers and enable progress towards more robust
methods.
Generating this new kind of adversarial example, however, is challenging. It is clear that adding small
noise is a valid mechanism for generating new images from a desired class—the label should not
change if the perturbation is small enough. How can we generate completely new images from a given
class? In this paper, we leverage recent advances in generative modeling [19, 20, 21]. Specifically,
we train an Auxiliary Classifier Generative Adversarial Network (AC-GAN [20]) to model the set
of legitimate images for each class. Conditioned on a desired class, we can search over the latent
code of the generative model to find examples that are mis-classified by the model under attack, even
when protected by the most robust defense methods available. The images that successfully fool the
classifier without confusing humans (verified via Amazon Mechanical Turk [22]) are referred to as
Unrestricted Adversarial Examples1. The efficacy of our attacking method is demonstrated on the
MNIST [25], SVHN [26], and CelebA [27] datasets, where our attacks uniformly achieve over 84%
success rates. In addition, our unrestricted adversarial examples show moderate transferability to
other architectures, reducing by 35.2% the accuracy of a black-box certified classifier (i.e. a certified
classifier with an architecture unknown to our method) [17].
2 Background
In this section, we review recent work on adversarial examples, defense methods, and conditional
generative models. Although adversarial examples can be crafted for many domains, we focus on
image classification tasks in the rest of this paper, and will use the words “examples” and “images”
interchangeably.
Adversarial examples Let x ∈ Rm denote an input image to a classifier f : Rm → {1, 2, · · · , k},
and assume the attacker has full knowledge of f (a.k.a., white-box setting). [1] discovered that it
is possible to find a slightly different image x′ ∈ Rm such that ‖x′ − x‖ ≤  but f(x′) 6= f(x), by
solving a surrogate optimization problem with L-BFGS [28]. Different matrix norms ‖·‖ have been
used, such as l∞ ([9]), l2 ([29]) or l0 ([30]). Similar optimization-based methods are also proposed
in [31, 32]. In [2], the authors observe that f(x) is approximately linear and propose the Fast Gradient
Sign Method (FGSM), which applies a first-order approximation of f(x) to speed up the generation
of adversarial examples. This procedure can be repeated several times to give a stronger attack named
Projected Gradient Descent (PGD [10]).
Defense methods Existing defense methods typically try to make classifiers more robust to small
perturbations of the image. There has been an “arms race” between increasingly sophisticated attack
and defense methods. As indicated in [33], the strongest defenses to date are adversarial training [10]
and certified defenses [16, 17]. In this paper, we focus our investigation of unrestricted adversarial
attacks on these defenses.
Generative adversarial networks (GANs) A GAN [19, 20, 34, 35, 36] is composed of a generator
gθ(z) and a discriminator dφ(x). The generator maps a source of noise z ∼ Pz to a synthetic image
x = gθ(z). The discriminator receives an image x and produces a value dφ(x) to distinguish whether
it is sampled from the true image distribution Px or generated by gθ(z). The goal of GAN training
is to learn a discriminator to reliably distinguish between fake and real images, and to use this
discriminator to train a good generator by trying to fool the discriminator. To stabilize training, we
use the Wasserstein GAN [34] formulation with gradient penalty [21], which solves the following
optimization problem
min
θ
max
φ
Ez∼Pz [dφ(gθ(z))]− Ex∼Px [dφ(x)] + λ Ex˜∼Px˜ [(‖∇x˜dφ(x˜)‖2 − 1)2],
1In previous drafts we called it Generative Adversarial Examples. We switched the name to emphasize the
difference from [23]. Concurrently, the same name was also used in [24] to refer to adversarial examples beyond
small perturbations.
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where Px˜ is the distribution obtained by sampling uniformly along straight lines between pairs of
samples from Px and generated images from gθ(z).
To generate adversarial examples with the intended semantic information, we also need to control
the labels of the generated images. One popular method of incorporating label information into the
generator is Auxiliary Classifier GAN (AC-GAN [20]), where the conditional generator gθ(z, y)
takes label y as input and an auxiliary classifier cψ(x) is introduced to predict the labels of both
training and generated images. Let cψ(y | x) be the confidence of predicting label y for an input
image x. The optimization objectives for the generator and the discriminator, respectively, are:
min
θ
−Ez∼Pz,y∼Py [dφ(gθ(z, y))− log cψ(y | gθ(z, y)))]
min
φ,ψ
Ez∼Pz,y∼Py [dφ(gθ(z, y))]− Ex∼Px [dφ(x)]− Ex∼Px,y∼Py|x [log cψ(y | x)]
+ λ Ex˜∼Px˜ [(‖∇x˜dφ(x˜)‖2 − 1)2],
where dφ(·) is the discriminator, Py represents a uniform distribution over all labels {1, 2, · · · , k},
Py|x denotes the ground-truth distribution of y given x, and Pz is chosen to be N (0, 1) in our
experiments.
3 Methods
3.1 Unrestricted adversarial examples
We start this section by formally characterizing perturbation-based and unrestricted adversarial
examples. Let I be the set of all digital images under consideration. Suppose o : O ⊆ I →
{1, 2, · · · ,K} is an oracle that takes an image in its domain O and outputs one of K labels. In
addition, we consider a classifier f : I → {1, 2, · · · ,K} that can give a prediction for any image in
I, and assume f 6= o. Equipped with those notations, we can provide definitions used in this paper:
Definition 1 (Perturbation-Based Adversarial Examples). Given a subset of (test) images T ⊂ O,
small constant  > 0, and matrix norm ‖·‖, a perturbation-based adversarial example is defined to
be any image in Ap , {x ∈ O | ∃x′ ∈ T , ‖x− x′‖ ≤  ∧ f(x′) = o(x′) = o(x) 6= f(x)}.
In other words, traditional adversarial examples are based on perturbing a correctly classified image
in T so that f gives an incorrect prediction, according to the oracle o.
Definition 2 (Unrestricted Adversarial Examples). An unrestricted adversarial example is any image
that is an element of Au , {x ∈ O | o(x) 6= f(x)}.
In most previous work on perturbation-based adversarial examples, the oracle o is implicitly defined
as a black box that gives ground-truth predictions (consistent with human judgments), T is chosen
to be the test dataset, and ‖·‖ is usually one of l∞ ([9]), l2 ([29]) or l0 ([30]) matrix norms. Since
o corresponds to human evaluation, O should represent all images that look realistic to humans,
including those with small perturbations. The past work assumed o(x) was known by restricting x to
be close to another image x′ which came from a labeled dataset. Our work removes this restriction,
by using a high quality generative model which can generate samples which, with high probability,
humans will label with a given class. From the definition it is clear that Ap ⊂ Au, which means our
proposed unrestricted adversarial examples are a strict generalization of traditional perturbation-based
adversarial examples, where we remove the small-norm constraints.
3.2 Practical unrestricted adversarial attacks
The key to practically producing unrestricted adversarial examples is to model the set of legitimate
images O. We do so by training a generative model g(z, y) to map a random variable z ∈ Rm
and a label y ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K} to a legitimate image x = g(z, y) ∈ O satisfying o(x) = y. If the
generative model is ideal, we will have O ≡ {g(z, y) | y ∈ {1, 2, · · · ,K}, z ∈ Rm}. Given such a
model we can in principle enumerate all unrestricted adversarial examples for a given classifier f , by
finding all z and y such that f(g(z, y)) 6= y.
In practice, we can exploit different approximations of the ideal generative model to produce different
kinds of unrestricted adversarial examples. Because of its reliable conditioning and high fidelity
image generation, we choose AC-GAN [20] as our basic class-conditional generative model. In what
follows, we explore two attacks derived from variants of AC-GAN (see pseudocode in Appendix B).
3
Basic attack Let gθ(z, y), cφ(x) be the generator and auxiliary classifier of AC-GAN, and let f(x)
denote the classifier that we wish to attack. We focus on targeted unrestricted adversarial attacks,
where the attacker tries to generate an image x so that o(x) = ysource but f(x) = ytarget. In order to
produce unrestricted adversarial examples, we propose finding the appropriate z by minimizing a
loss function L that is carefully designed to produce high fidelity unrestricted adversarial examples.
We decompose the loss as L = L0 + λ1L1 + λ2L2, where λ1, λ2 are positive hyperparameters for
weighting different terms. The first component
L0 , − log f(ytarget | gθ(z, ysource)) (1)
encourages f to predict ytarget, where f(y | x) denotes the confidence of predicting label y for input
x. The second component
L1 , 1
m
m∑
i=1
max{|zi − z0i | − , 0} (2)
soft-constrains the search region of z so that it is close to a randomly sampled noise vector z0.
Here z = (z1, z2, · · · , zm), {z01 , z02 , · · · , z0m} i.i.d.∼ N (0, 1), and  is a small positive constant. For a
good generative model, we expect that x0 = gθ(z0, ysource) is diverse for randomly sampled z0 and
o(x0) = ysource holds with high probability. Therefore, by reducing the distance between z and z0,
L1 has the effect of generating more diverse adversarial examples from class ysource. Without this
constraint, the optimization may always converge to the same example for each class. Finally
L2 , − log cφ(ysource | gθ(z, ysource)) (3)
encourages the auxiliary classifier cφ to give correct predictions, and cφ(y | x) is the confidence
of predicting y for x. We hypothesize that cφ is relatively uncorrelated with f , which can possibly
promote the generated images to reside in class ysource.
Note that L can be easily modified to perform untargeted attacks, for example replacing L0 with
−maxy 6=ysource log f(y | gθ(z, ysource)). Additionally, when performing our evaluations, we need to
use humans to ensure that our generative model is actually generating images which are in one of
the desired classes with high probability. In contrast, when simply perturbing an existing image,
past work has been able to assume that the true label does not change if the perturbation is small.
Thus, during evaluation, to test whether the images are legitimate and belong to class ysource, we use
crowd-sourcing on Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk).
Noise-augmented attack The representation power of the AC-GAN generator can be improved
if we add small trainable noise to the generated image. Let attack be the maximum magnitude
of noise that we want to apply. The noise-augmented generator is defined as gθ(z, τ, y; attack) ,
gθ(z, y)+attack tanh(τ), where τ is an auxiliary trainable variable with the same shape as gθ(z, y) and
tanh is applied element-wise. As long as attack is small, gθ(z, τ, y; attack) should be indistinguishable
from gθ(z, y), and o(gθ(z, τ, y; attack)) = o(gθ(z, y)), i.e., adding small noise should preserve
image quality and ground-truth labels. Similar to the basic attack, noise-augmented unrestricted
adversarial examples can be obtained by solving minz,τ L, with gθ(z, ysource) in (1) and (3) replaced
by gθ(z, τ, ysource; attack).
One interesting observation is that traditional perturbation-based adversarial examples can also be
obtained as a special case of our noise-augmented attack, by choosing a suitable gθ(z, y) instead of
the AC-GAN generator. Specifically, let T be the test dataset, and Ty = {x ∈ T | o(x) = y}. We
can use a discrete latent code z ∈ {1, 2, · · · , |Tysource |} and specify gθ(z, y) to be the z-th image in Ty .
Then, when z0 is uniformly drawn from {1, 2, · · · , |Tysource |}, λ1 →∞ and λ2 = 0, we will recover
an objective similar to FGSM [2] or PGD [10].
4 Experiments
4.1 Experimental details
Amazon Mechanical Turk settings In order to demonstrate the success of our unrestricted ad-
versarial examples, we need to verify that their ground-truth labels disagree with the classifier’s
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Table 1: Attacking certified defenses on MNIST. The unrestricted adversarial examples here are
untargeted and without noise-augmentation. Numbers represent success rates (%) of our attack, based
on human evaluations on MTurk. While no perturbation-based attack with  = 0.1 can have a success
rate larger than the certified rate (when evaluated on the training set) we are able to achieve that by
considering a more general attack mechanism.
Classifier
Source 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Overall Certified Rate( = 0.1)
Raghunathan et al. [16] 90.8 48.3 86.7 93.7 94.7 85.7 93.4 80.8 96.8 95.0 86.6 ≤ 35.0
Kolter & Wang [17] 94.2 57.3 92.2 94.0 93.7 89.6 95.7 81.4 96.3 93.5 88.8 ≤ 5.8
predictions. To this end, we use Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) to manually label each unre-
stricted adversarial example.
To improve signal-to-noise ratio, we assign the same image to 5 different workers and use the result
of a majority vote as ground-truth. For each worker, the MTurk interface contains 10 images and
for each image, we use a button group to show all possible labels. The worker is asked to select the
correct label for each image by clicking on the corresponding button. In addition, each button group
contains an “N/A” button that the workers are instructed to click on if they think the image is not
legitimate or does not belong to any class. To confirm our MTurk setup results in accurate labels,
we ran a test to label MNIST images. The results show that 99.6% of majority votes obtained from
workers match the ground-truth labels.
For some of our experiments, we want to investigate whether unrestricted adversarial examples are
more similar to existing images in the dataset, compared to perturbation-based attacks. We use the
classical A/B test for this, i.e., each synthesized adversarial example is randomly paired with an
existing image from the dataset, and the annotators are asked to identify the synthesized images.
Screen shots of all our MTurk interfaces can be found in the Appendix E.
Datasets The datasets used in our experiments are MNIST [25], SVHN [26], and CelebA [27].
Both MNIST and SVHN are images of digits. For CelebA, we group the face images according to
female/male, and focus on gender classification. We test our attack on these datasets because the tasks
(digit categorization and gender classification) are easier and less ambiguous for MTurk workers,
compared to those having more complicated labels, such as Fashion-MNIST [37] or CIFAR-10 [38].
Model Settings We train our AC-GAN [20] with gradient penalty [21] on all available data
partitions of each dataset, including training, test, and extra images (SVHN only). This is based on
the assumption that attackers can access a large number of images. We use ResNet [39] blocks in
our generative models, mainly following the architecture design of [21]. For training classifiers, we
only use the training partition of each dataset. We copy the network architecture from [10] for the
MNIST task, and use a similar ResNet architecture to [13] for other datasets. For more details about
architectures, hyperparameters and adversarial training methods, please refer to Appendix C.
4.2 Untargeted attacks against certified defenses
We first show that our new adversarial attack can bypass the recently proposed certified defenses [16,
17]. These defenses can provide a theoretically verified certificate that a training example cannot be
classified incorrectly by any perterbation-based attack with a perturbation size less than a given .
Setup For each source class, we use our method to produce 1000 untargeted unrestricted adversarial
examples without noise-augmentation. By design these are all incorrectly classified by the target
classifer. Since they are synthesized from scratch, we report in Tab. 1 the fraction labeled by human
annotators as belonging to the intended source class. We conduct these experiments on the MNIST
dataset to ensure a fair comparison, since certified classifiers with pre-trained weights for this dataset
can be obtained directly from the authors of [16, 17]. We produce untargeted unrestricted adversarial
examples in this task, as the certificates are for untargeted attacks.
Results Tab. 1 shows the results. We can see that the stronger of the two certified defenses, [17],
provides a certificate for 94.2% of the samples in the MNIST test set with  = 0.1 (out of 1). Since
our technique is not perturbation-based, 88.8% of our samples are able to fool this defense. Note this
does not mean the original defense is broken, since we are considering a different threat model.
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(a) Untargeted attacks against [16]. (b) Untargeted attacks against [17].
Figure 1: Random samples of untargeted unrestricted adversarial examples (w/o noise) against
certified defenses on MNIST. Green and red borders indicate success/failure respectively, according
to MTurk results. The annotation in upper-left corner of each image represents the classifier’s
prediction. For example, the entry in the top left corner (left panel) is classified as 0 by MTurk, and
as a 7 by the classifier, and is therefore considered a success. The entry in the top left corner (right
panel) is not classified as 0 by MTurk, and is therefore counted as a failure.
Figure 2: Comparing PGD attacks with high  = 0.31 (top) and ours (bottom) for [16] on MNIST.
The two methods have comparable success rates of 86.0% (with  = 0.31) and 86.6% respectively.
Our images, however, look significantly more realistic.
4.2.1 Evading human detection
One natural question is, why not increase  to achieve higher success rates? With a large enough ,
existing perturbation-based attacks will be able to fool certified defenses using larger perturbations.
However, we can see the downside of this approach in Fig. 2: because perturbations are large, the
resulting samples appear obviously altered.
Setup To show this quantitatively, we increase the  value for a traditional perturbation-based attack
(a 100-step PGD) until the attack success rates on the certified defenses are similar to those for our
technique. Specifically, we used an  of 0.31 and 0.2 to attack [16] and [17] respectively, resulting
in success rates of 86.0% and 83.5%. We then asked human annotators to distinguish between the
adversarial examples and unmodified images from the dataset, in an A/B test setting. If the two are
indistinguishable we expect a 50% success rate.
Results We found that with perturbation-based examples [16], annotators can correctly identify
adversarial images with a 92.9% success rate. In contrast, they can only correctly identify adversarial
examples from our attack with a 76.8% success rate. Against [17], the success rates are 87.6% and
78.2% respectively. We expect this gap to increase even more as better generative models and defense
mechanisms are developed.
4.3 Targeted attacks against adversarial training
The theoretical guarantees provided by certified defenses are satisfying, however, these defenses
require computationally expensive optimization techniques and do not yet scale to larger datasets.
Furthermore, more traditional defense techniques actually perform better in practice in certain cases.
[33] has shown that the strongest non-certified defense currently available is the adversarial training
technque presented in [10], so we also evaluated our attack against this defense technique. We
perform this evaluation in the targeted setting in order to better understand how the success rate varies
between various source-target pairs.
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(a) sampled examples on MNIST (b) success rates on MNIST
(c) sampled examples on SVHN (d) success rates on SVHN
Figure 3: (a)(c) Random samples of targeted unrestricted adversarial examples (w/o noise). Row i
and column j is an image that is supposed to be class i and classifier predicts it to be class j. Green
border indicates that the image is voted legitimate by MTurk workers, and red border means the label
given by workers (as shown in the upper left corner) disagrees with the image’s source class. (b)(d)
The success rates (%) of our targeted unrestricted adversarial attack (w/o noise). Also see Tab. 2.
Table 2: Overall success rates of our targeted unrestricted adversarial attacks. Success rates of PGD
are provided to show that the network is adversarially-trained to be robust. †Best public result.
Robust Classifier Accuracy
(orig. images)
Success Rate
of PDG
Our Success Rate
(w/o Noise)
Our Success Rate
(w/ Noise)
attack
Madry network [10] on MNIST 98.4 10.4† 85.2 85.0 0.3
ResNet (adv-trained) on SVHN 96.3 59.9 84.2 91.6 0.03
ResNet (adv-trained) on CelebA 97.3 20.5 91.1 86.7 0.03
Setup We produce 100 unrestricted adversarial examples for each pair of source and target classes
and ask human annotators to label them. We also compare to traditional PGD attacks as a reference.
For the perturbation-based attacks against the ResNet networks, we use a 20-step PGD with values
of  given in the table. For the perturbation-based attack against the Madry network [10], we report
the best published result [40]. It’s important to note that the reference perturbation-based results
are not directly comparable to ours because they are i) untargeted attacks and ii) limited to small
perturbations. Nonetheless, they can provide a good sense of the robustness of adversarially-trained
networks.
Results A summary of the results can be seen in Tab. 2. We can see that the defense from [10]
is quite effective against the basic perturbation-based attack, limiting the success rate to 10.4% on
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Figure 4: Sampled unrestricted adversarial examples (w/o noise) for fooling the classifier to misclas-
sify a female as male (left) and the other way around (right). Green, red borders and annotations have
the same meanings as in Fig. 3, except “F” is short for “Female” and “M” is short for “Male”.
Table 3: Transferability of unrestricted adversarial examples on MNIST. We attack Madry Net [10]
(adv) with our method and feed legitimate unrestricted adversarial examples, as verified by AMT
workers, to other classifiers. Here “adv” is short for “adversarially-trained” (with PGD) and “no adv”
means no adversarial training is used. Numbers represent accuracies of classifiers.
Attack Type
Classifier Madry Net [10]
(no adv)
Madry Net [10]
(adv)
ResNet
(no adv)
ResNet
(adv) [16] [17]
No attack 99.5 98.4 99.3 99.4 95.8 98.2
Our attack (w/o noise) 95.1 0 92.7 93.7 77.1 84.3
Our attack (w/ noise, attack = 0.3) 78.3 0 73.8 84.9 78.1 63.0
MNIST, and 20.5% on CelebA. In contrast, our unrestricted adversarial examples (with or without
noise-augmentation) can successfully fool this defense with more than an 84% success rate on all
datasets. We find that adding noise-augmentation to our attack does not significantly change the
results, boosting the SVNH success rate by 7.4% while reducing the CelebA success rate by 4.4%.
In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4, we show samples and detailed success rates of unrestricted adversarial attacks
without noise-augmentation. More samples and success rate details are provided in Appendix D.
4.4 Transferability
An important feature of traditional perturbation-based attacks is their transferability across different
classifiers.
Setup To test how our unrestricted adversarial examples transfer to other architectures, we use
all of the unrestricted adversarial examples we created to target Madry Network [41] on MNIST
for the results in Section 4.3, and filter out invalid ones using the majority vote of a set of human
annotators. We then feed these unrestricted adversarial examples to other architectures. Besides the
adversarially-trained Madry Network, the architectures we consider include a ResNet [39] similar
to those used on SVHN and CelebA datasets in Section 4.3. We test both normally-trained and
adversarially-trained ResNets. We also take the architecture of Madry Network in [10] and train it
without adversarial training.
Results We show in Tab. 3 that unrestricted adversarial examples exhibit moderate transferability
to different classifiers, which means they can be threatening in a black-box scenario as well. For
attacks without noise-augmentation, the most successful transfer happens against [16], where the
success rate is 22.9%. For the noise-augmented attack, the most successful transfer is against [17],
with a success rate of 37.0%. The results indicate that the transferability of unrestricted adversarial
examples can be generally enhanced with noise-augmentation.
5 Analysis
In this section, we analyze why our method can attack a classifier using a generative model, under
some idealized assumptions. For simplicity, we assume the target f(x) is a binary classifier, where
x ∈ Rn is the input vector. Previous explanations for perturbation-based attacks [2] assume that
the score function s(x) ∈ R used by f is almost linear. Suppose s(x) ≈ wᵀx + b and w, x ∈ Rn
both have high dimensions (large n). We can choose the perturbation to be δ =  sign(w), so that
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s(x + δ) − s(x) ≈  · n. Though  is small, n is typically a large number, therefore  · n can be
large enough to change the prediction of f(x). Similarly, we can explain the existence of unrestricted
adversarial examples. Suppose g(z, y) ∈ Rn is an ideal generative model that can always produce
legitimate images of class y ∈ {0, 1} for any z ∈ Rm, and assume for all z0, f(g(z0, y)) = y. The
end-to-end score function s(g(z, y)) can be similarly approximated by s(g(z, y)) ≈ wᵀg z + bg, and
we can again take δz =  sign(wg), so that s(g(z0 + δz, y))− s(g(z0, y)) ≈  ·m. Because m 1 ,
 ·m can be large enough to change the prediction of f , justifying why we can find many unrestricted
adversarial examples by minimizing L.
It becomes harder to analyze the case of an imperfect generative model. We provide a theoretical
analysis in Appendix A under relatively strong assumptions to argue that most unrestricted adversarial
examples produced by our method should be legitimate.
6 Related work
Some recent attacks also use more structured perturbations beyond simple norm bounds. For example,
[42] shows that wearing eyeglass frames can cause face-recognition models to misclassify. [43] tests
the robustness of classifiers to “nuisance variables”, such as geometric distortions, occlusions, and
illumination changes. [44] proposes converting the color space from RGB to HSV and shifting H,
S components. [45] proposes mapping the input image to a latent space using GANs, and search
for adversarial examples in the vicinity of the latent code. In contrast to our unrestricted adversarial
examples where images are synthesized from scratch, these attacking methods craft malicious inputs
based on a given test dataset using a limited set of image manipulations. Similar to what we have
shown for traditional adversarial examples, we can view these attacking methods as special instances
of our unrestricted adversarial attack framework by choosing a suitable generative model.
There is also a related class of maliciously crafted inputs named fooling images [46]. Different
from adversarial examples, fooling images consist of noise or patterns that do not necessarily look
realistic but are nonetheless predicted to be in one of the known classes with high confidence. As
with our unrestricted adversarial examples, fooling images are not restricted to small norm-bounded
perturbations. However, fooling images do not typically look legitimate to humans, whereas our
focus is on generating adversarial examples which look realistic and meaningful.
Generative adversarial networks have also been used in some previous attack and defense mechanisms.
Examples include AdvGAN [23], DeepDGA [47], ATN [48], GAT [49] and Defense-GAN [14]. The
closest to our work are AdvGAN and DeepDGA. AdvGAN also proposes to use GANs for creating
adversarial examples. However, their adversarial examples are still based on small norm-bounded
perturbations. This enables them to assume adversarial examples have the same ground-truth labels
as unperturbed images, while we use human evaluation to ensure the labels for our evaluation.
DeepDGA uses GANs to generate adversarial domain names. However, domain names are arguably
easier to generate than images since they need to satisfy fewer constraints.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we explore a new threat model and propose a more general form of adversarial attacks.
Instead of perturbing existing data points, our unrestricted adversarial examples are synthesized
entirely from scratch, using conditional generative models. As shown in experiments, this new kind
of adversarial examples undermines current defenses, which are designed for perturbation-based
attacks. Moreover, unrestricted adversarial examples are able to transfer to other classifiers trained
using the same dataset. After releasing the first draft of this paper, there has been a surge of interest
in more general adversarial examples. For example, a contest [24] has recently been launched on
unrestricted adversarial examples.
Both traditional perturbation-based attacks and the new method proposed in this paper exploit current
classifiers’ vulnerability to covariate shift [50]. The prevalent training framework in machine learning,
Empirical Risk Minimization [51], does not guarantee performance when tested on a different data
distribution. Therefore, it is important to develop new training methods that can generalize to different
input distributions, or new methods that can reliably detect covariate shift [52]. Such new methods
should be able to alleviate threats of both perturbation-based and unrestricted adversarial examples.
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A Analysis of imperfect generators
In this section, we give one possible explanation for why in practice generative models can create
adversarial examples that fool classifiers. We will now assume that generators not always generate
legitimate images from the desired class. We will argue that, under some strong assumptions, when
the classifier’s prediction contradicts the generator’s label conditioning, it is more likely for the
classifier to make a mistake, rather than the generator generates an incorrect image.
In order to make our argument, we first need Proposition 1:
Proposition 1. Let W ∈ Rn×m be a random matrix. Assume entries of W are mutually independent
and bounded, i.e., |wij | ≤ K for all i and j. Then, with probability 1− δ, the following bound holds
1
n
max
‖∆x‖∞≤
‖W ·∆x‖1 ≤ 4K
√
m
(
m log 2 + log 1δ
)
n
+ Km. (4)
Intuitively, Proposition 1 characterizes the robustness of a “typical” linear function as a function
of its input and output dimensions. When the input dimension m is fixed, the average maximum
perturbation of output 1n max‖∆x‖∞≤ ‖W ·∆x‖ is upper bounded by 4K
√
m
(
m log 2+log 1δ
)
n +
Km, which decreases as n gets greater. Similarly, when the output dimension n is fixed, the average
maximum perturbation is upper bounded by O(m), which decreases as m gets smaller. As long as
the entries of the weight matrix are mutually independent and bounded, this relationship between
robustness and dimensions persists.
Although not rigorously proven, we believe that a similar relationship holds for non-linear functions
as well. Consider a non-linear function f(x), where x ∈ Rm and f(x) ∈ Rn. For each data sample
xi, we can linearize f(x) at xi to get f(x) ≈ Jxi(x − xi) = Jxi∆x. We shall assume that the
induced random matrix Jx ∈ Rn×m,x ∼ Px has bounded and mutually independent entries, and
can therefore apply Proposition 1 to get the same robustness-dimension relationship.
In unrestricted adversarial attacks, we have a conditional generative model g(z, y) that takes as input
a random noise vector z ∈ Rl and a label y and generates an image from Rm. The target classifier
f(x) takes an image x ∈ Rm and output scores from Rn that are subsequently used for classification.
In practice, we usually have l m and m n. From our discussion above, the generative model
should be asymptotically more robust than the classifier. Therefore, when perturbing z such that
f(g(z′, y)), ‖z′ − z‖∞ ≤  predicts an incorrect label (not y), it is more likely that f makes the
mistake, rather than g not generating an image with label y. That could explain why we can construct
legitimate unrestricted adversarial examples.
Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. Let W = (wᵀ1 ,w
ᵀ
2 , · · · ,wᵀn)ᵀ, where wi represents the i-th row vector of W. In order to
bound max‖∆x‖∞≤ ‖W∆x‖1, we first bound ‖W∆x‖1 for any fixed vector ∆x from the ballB := {x | ‖x‖∞ ≤ } and then apply union bound. Note that ‖W∆x‖1 can be written as the
sum of n terms, i.e., ‖W∆x‖1 =
∑n
i=1 |wᵀi ∆x|, where each term wᵀi ∆x can be bounded using
McDiarmid’s inequality [53]
P
 m∑
j=1
wij(∆x)j −Mi ≥ λ
 ≤ exp( −λ2
2mK22
)
, (5)
where Mi =
∑m
j=1 E[wij(∆x)j ] ≤ Km, according to the assumption.
From (5) we conclude the random variable wᵀi ∆x−Mi is sub-Gaussian [54], hence
E [exp(s|wᵀi ∆x−Mi|)] ≤ exp
(
4s2mK22
)
⇒E
[
exp
(
s
n∑
i=1
|wᵀi ∆x−Mi|
)]
≤ exp(4s2nmK22).
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With Markov inequality [53], we obtain
P
(
n∑
i=1
|wᵀi ∆x−Mi| ≥ λ
)
≤ exp(4s2nmK22 − sλ). (6)
Because (6) holds for every s ∈ R, we can optimize s to get the tightest bound
P
(
n∑
i=1
|wᵀi ∆x−Mi| ≥ λ
)
≤ exp
(
− λ
2
16nmK22
)
⇒P
(
‖W∆x‖1 ≥ λ+
n∑
i=1
|Mi|
)
≤ exp
(
− λ
2
16nmK22
)
⇒P (‖W∆x‖1 ≥ λ+Knm) ≤ exp
(
− λ
2
16nmK22
)
.
Now we are ready to apply union bound to control max∆x∈B ‖W∆x‖1. Although B is an infinite
set, we only need to consider a finite set of vertices V := {x | xi ∈ {−, }, ∀i = 1, 2, · · · ,m}.
To see this, assume x∗ = arg maxx∈S ‖Wx‖1 but x∗ 6∈ V. Because B is a convex polytope with
vertices V, we have x∗ =
∑2m
i=1 λivi, where λi ∈ [0, 1],
∑2m
i=1 λi = 1 and vi denotes the i-th vertex
in V. By triangle inequality we have
‖Wx∗‖1 =
∥∥∥∥∥
2m∑
i=1
λiWvi
∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤
2m∑
i=1
λi ‖Wvi‖1
≤
(
2m∑
i=1
λi
)
max
i∈[0,2m]
‖Wvi‖1
= max
i∈[0,2m]
‖Wvi‖1 ≤ ‖Wx∗‖1 .
Let v∗ := arg maxvi,i∈[0,2m] ‖Wvi‖1. From the above derivation we conclude ‖Wv∗‖1 =
‖Wx∗‖1 and therefore it is sufficient to only consider V for union bound:
P
(
max
∆x∈S
‖W∆x‖1 ≥ λ+ Knm
)
= P
(
max
∆x∈V
‖W∆x‖1 ≥ λ+ Knm
)
≤ |V|P (‖W∆x‖1 ≥ λ+ Knm) (Union Bound)
≤ 2m exp
(
− λ
2
16nmK22
)
.
In other words, with probability 1− δ,
max
∆x∈S
‖W∆x‖1 ≤ 4K
√
mn
(
m log 2 + log
1
δ
)
+ Knm,
and the statement of our theorem gets proved.
B Pseudocode
C Detailed experimental settings
Datasets The datasets used in our experiments are MNIST [25], SVHN [26], and CelebA [27].
Both MNIST and SVHN are images of digits. MNIST contains 60000 28-by-28 gray-scale digits in
the training set, and 10000 digits in the test set. In SVHN, there are 73257 32-by-32 images of house
numbers (captured from Google Street View) for training, 26032 images for testing, and 531131
additional images as extra training data. For CelebA, there are 202599 celebrity faces, each of which
has 40 binary attribute annotations. We group the face images according to female/male, and focus on
gender classification. The first 150000 images are split for training and the rest are used for testing.
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Algorithm 1 Unrestricted Adversarial Example Targeted Attack
1: procedure ATTACK(ytarget, ysource, f, θ, φ, , attack, λ1, λ2, α, T )
2: Define L(z, τ ; z0, ytarget, ysource, f, θ, φ, , attack, λ1, λ2)
L =− log f(ytarget | gθ(z, ysource) + attack tanh(τ)) + λ1 · 1
m
m∑
i=1
max{|zi − zi| − , 0}
− λ2 · log cφ(ysource | gθ(z, ysource) + attack tanh(τ))
3: Initialize xattack ← ∅
4: while xattack = ∅ do
5: Sample τ ∼ N (0, 1)
6: Sample z0 ∼ N (0, 1)
7: Initialize z ← z0
8: for i = 1 . . . T do
9: Update z ← z − α · ∂L(z,τ)∂z . α is the learning rate.
10: ∆← ∂L(z,τ)∂τ
11: Update τ ← τ − α · ∆‖∆‖ . We found gradient normalization to be effective
12: end for
13: x← gθ(z, ysource) + attack tanh(τ)
14: if ytarget = arg maxy p(f(x) = y) then
15: x← xattack
16: end if
17: end while
18: return xattack
19: end procedure
Adversarial training Regarding adversarial training, we directly use the weights provided by [10]
for MNIST. For other tasks, we combine the techniques from [10] and [9]. More specifically, suppose
pixel space is [0, 255]. We first sample  from N (0, 8), take the absolute value and truncate it
to [0, 16], after which we use PGD with  and iteration number bmin( + 4, 1.25)c to generate
adversarial examples for adversarial training. As suggested in [9], this has the benefit of making
models robust to attacks with different .
Model architectures For the AC-GAN architecture, we mostly follow the best designs tested
in [21]. Specifically, we adapted their AC-GAN architecture on CIFAR-10 for our experiments
of MNIST and SVHN, and used their AC-GAN architecture on 64×64 LSUN for our CelebA
experiments. Since MNIST digits have lower resolution than CIFAR-10 images, we reduced one
residual block in the generator so that the output shape is smaller, and reduced the channels of output
from 3 to 1. The other components of AC-GAN, including architecture of the discriminator and
auxiliary classifier, are all the same as described in [21].
For classifier architectures, we obtained networks and weights from authors of [10, 16, 17] so that
we can be consistent with their papers. The ResNet architectures used for SVHN, CelebA and
transferability experiments are shown in Tab. 5.
Hyperparameters of attacks Tab. 4 shows our hyperparameters of all unrestricted adversarial
attacks used in this paper, following the same notations in arguments of Algorithm 1.
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Table 4: Hyperparameters of unrestricted adversarial attacks. Notations are the same as in Algorithm 1.
∗Target class is “Male”. †Target class is “Female”.
Datasets Classifier Targeted Noise λ1 λ2  attack α T
MNIST Madry Net [10] Yes No 50 0 0.1 0 1 500
MNIST Madry Net [10] Yes Yes 50 0 0.1 0.3 1 500
MNIST [16] No No 100 0 0.1 0 10 100
MNIST [17] No No 100 0 0.1 0 1 100
SVHN ResNet Yes No 100 100 0.01 0 0.1 200
SVHN ResNet Yes Yes 100 100 0.01 0.03 0.5 300
CelebA∗ ResNet Yes No 100 100 0.001 0 1 200
CelebA∗ ResNet Yes Yes 100 100 0.001 0.03 1 200
CelebA† ResNet Yes No 100 100 0.1 0 0.1 200
CelebA† ResNet Yes Yes 100 100 0.1 0.03 0.1 200
Table 5: ResNet Classifier Architecture. We set the base number of feature maps to m = 4 for
MNIST and m = 16 for SVHN and CelebA.
Name Configuration Replicate Block
Initial Layer 3× 3 conv. m maps. 1× 1 stride. —
Residual Block 1
batch normalization, leaky relu
×10
3× 3 conv. m maps. 1× 1 stride
batch normalization, leaky relu
3× 3 conv. m maps. 1× 1 stride
residual addition
Resize Block 1
batch normalization, leaky relu
—
3× 3 conv. 2m maps. 2× 2 stride
batch normalization, leaky relu
3× 3 conv. 2m maps. 1× 1 stride
average pooling, padding
Residual Block 2
batch normalization, leaky relu
×9
3× 3 conv. 2m maps. 1× 1 stride
batch normalization, leaky relu
3× 3 conv. 2m maps. 1× 1 stride
residual addition
Resize Block 2
batch normalization, leaky relu
—
3× 3 conv. 4m maps. 2× 2 stride
batch normalization, leaky relu
3× 3 conv. 4m maps. 1× 1 stride
average pooling, padding
Residual Block 3
batch normalization, leaky relu
×9
3× 3 conv. 4m maps. 1× 1 stride
batch normalization, leaky relu
3× 3 conv. 4m maps. 1× 1 stride
residual addition
Pooling Layer batch normalization, leaky relu, average pooling —
Output Layer 10 dense, softmax —
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D Additional samples
(a) Extended plot for untargeted attacks against [16].
(b) Extended plot for untargeted attacks against [17].
Figure 5: (Extended plot of Fig. 1) Random samples of untargeted unrestricted adversarial examples
(w/o noise) against certified defenses on MNIST. Green and red borders indicate success/failure
respectively, according to MTurk results. The annotation in upper-left corner of each image represents
the classifier’s prediction.
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(a) success rates on MNIST (b) success rates on SVHN
Figure 6: The success rates (%) of our targeted unrestricted adversarial attack with noise-
augmentation.
Figure 7: (Extended plot of Fig. 3(a)) Random samples of targeted unrestricted adversarial examples
(w/o noise) on MNIST. Green border indicates that the image is voted legitimate by MTurk workers,
and red border means the label given by workers (as shown in the upper left corner) disagrees with
the image’s source class. 18
Figure 8: Random samples of targeted unrestricted adversarial examples (w/ noise) on MNIST. Green
border indicates that the image is voted legitimate by MTurk workers, and red border means the label
given by workers (as shown in the upper left corner) disagrees with the image’s source class.
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Figure 9: (Extended plot of Fig. 3(c)) Random samples of targeted unrestricted adversarial examples
(w/o noise) on SVHN. Green border indicates that the image is voted legitimate by MTurk workers,
and red border means the label given by workers (as shown in the upper left corner) disagrees with
the image’s source class.
20
Figure 10: Random samples of targeted unrestricted adversarial examples (w/ noise) on SVHN. Green
border indicates that the image is voted legitimate by MTurk workers, and red border means the label
given by workers (as shown in the upper left corner) disagrees with the image’s source class.
21
Figure 11: (Extended plot of Fig. 4) Sampled unrestricted adversarial examples (w/o noise) for
fooling the classifier to misclassify a female as male (left) and the other way around (right). Green,
red borders and annotations have the same meanings as in Fig. 3, except “F” is short for “Female”
and “M” is short for “Male”.
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Figure 12: Sampled unrestricted adversarial examples (w/ noise) for fooling the classifier to misclas-
sify a female as male (left) and the other way around (right). Green, red borders and annotations have
the same meanings as in Fig. 3, except “F” is short for “Female” and “M” is short for “Male”.
E MTurk web interfaces
The MTurk web interfaces used for labeling our unrestricted adversarial examples are depicted in
Fig. 13. The A/B test interface used in Section 4.2.1 is shown in Fig. 14. In addition, Fig. 15
visualizes the uncertainty of MTurk annotators for labeling unrestricted adversarial examples, which
indicates that more than 40%-50% unrestricted adversarial examples (depending on the dataset) get
all of their 5 annotators agreed on one label.
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(a) The MTurk web interface for MNIST and SVHN.
(b) The MTurk web interface for CelebA.
Figure 13: MTurk web interfaces for labeling unrestricted adversarial examples.
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Figure 14: MTurk web interfaces for A/B test on MNIST.
Figure 15: The distribution of number of agreed votes for each image. For example, the red bar on
top of 5 means around 55% unrestricted adversarial examples on CelebA dataset are voted the same
label by all 5 MTurk annotators.
25
